Electronic voting has been widely used in modern democratic elections in recent years. Electronic voting has been a popular issue with cryptography technique because of the importance of voting results. There are many requirements for a secure electronic voting scheme. It is difficult for existing solutions to solve these incompatible requirements. Blockchain technology provides a new solution to electronic voting schemes. In this paper, we proposed an anonymous electronic voting scheme based on blockchain. This scheme effectively protects the privacy of voters. Unlike previously proposed blockchain electronic voting schemes, our scheme can be used in boardroom voting circumstances and allow voters to abstain from voting. More significantly, our scheme uses a blind signature and ring signature to eliminate "double-voting" behaviours. The results of the voting can be self-tallying by any nodes of our network because all ballots are stored in the blockchain bulletin board. At the end of this paper, we analyze our scheme with the requirements of a secure voting scheme.
Introduction
Electronic voting schemes play an important role in many modern states and have been widely used in governments, companies, and other organizations of democratic elections. The traditional voting process is quite cumbersome because voters must come to the polling station with their own ballot. This problem has a negative impact on the enthusiasm of voters and leads to a low participation rate of voting. Compared with traditional voting, electronic voting is a more economic system that addresses privacy and fairness.
Electronic voting is now one of the most popular issues with cryptography techniques because of the importance of voting results. According to [1] , the secure electronic voting system has many requirements: completeness, soundness, privacy, unreusability, eligibility, fairness, and verifiability. However, there are many vulnerabilities and drawbacks in electronic voting systems [2] [3] . Particularly, it is difficult for electronic voting systems to achieve the requirements of completeness and privacy. Completeness is easy to realize through a public board where voters show their ballots, but this fails to assure privacy. Privacy can be realized by secret ballots or anonymous communication channels, but this destroys completeness. Meanwhile, unreusability and privacy are also two incompatible requirements: prohibiting "double-voting" and ensuring privacy. Because of the security of elections and the advantages of electronic voting systems, these incompatible requirements have been a prevalent issue in electronic voting scheme researches.
Previous electronic voting schemes can be categorized into two main types: one involves the voter sending the ballot in an encrypted form and the other involves the voter sending the ballot through an anonymous communication channel. In the first type, some schemes use blind signature [1, [4] [5] [6] . These schemes mainly need a trust party to provide a signature on the ballots in order to ensure voting eligibility and voting message privacy. However, if the certification authority is trustless, these voting schemes can be identified as mendacious. Ring signature is also used in other voting schemes [7] [8] [9] [10] . These schemes employ ring signature to protect the privacy of voters and keep voting ballots eligible. Researches on this aspect mostly pay attention to forbidding "double-voting". In [1] , short linkable ring signature technology is used. If the user signs multiple times, anyone can tell that these signatures have been generated by the same group member. However, in [11] , Fujisaki pointed out that linkable ring signature does not consider the realistic threat that a dishonest node causes honest signers to be accused of "double-spending". In a voting scheme, an honest ballot can be discarded by a dishonest signer. The second type that schemes with an anonymous communication channel always requires the employment of an anonymous channel between the voter and the tallying authorities. This protocol requires trust tallying authorities. Any honest ballot can be easily abandoned by tallying authorities. The requirement of verifiability is missing.
Blockchain [12] provides new tools for settling this issue. Although blockchain like bitcoin was originally intended for money transfer, it equally focuses on the supposed incompatible requirements that all money transactions must be counted correctly and protect the privacy of the sender. Meanwhile, blockchain can be used as an open and immutable global database to store all voting information and transactions. Any attempt to corrupt the integrity of an election can be verified and correctly attributed. The entire legal ballot can be verified in the blockchain, and the voting result can be self-tallying.
The blockchain protocol has inspired many researches on electronic voting since its introduction. In practice, the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange Launches blockchain voting service [13] and TIVI [14] proposed a scheme that uses blockchain technology in electronic voting. However, these solutions all require a trusted authority. In this aspect of theory, McCorry [15] implemented an electronic voting scheme present in [16] on the Ethereum [17] blockchain. In [18] , Zhao implemented a voting scheme on bitcoin blockchain, providing the first implementation of a decentralized and self-tallying internet voting protocol. These schemes, however, need to add all the encrypted ballots together to cancel out the blind factor. There is an evident issue that all voters must participate in voting to compute the final tally. Therefore, these schemes are not suitable for large-scale elections. Hence, we will focus on an electronic voting scheme based on blockchain for large-scale voting. In [19] , when a vote progress is created, it will include the candidate's name and will serve as the foundation block, with every vote for that specific and candidate placed on top of it. This scheme ensures voters' legality by system check. This method is trustless and may contribute to counting illegal ballots. In [10] , Wu applied both ring signature and blockchain in a voting scheme. However, this scheme neglects the important "double-voting" issue in schemes, and the voter manager has the right to determine the voting right.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we present an anonymous and decentralized electronic voting scheme for boardroom voting. It is based on blockchain, where all the voting transactions are stored. Hence, all transactions are examined by all decentralized nodes, and any trustless behaviour can be detected and rejected. At the end of the voting process, the result of voting can be selftallying. Meanwhile, our scheme proposes to use blind signature and ring signature to protect the privacy of voters and prohibit "double-voting" at the same time.
Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will introduce some cryptographic techniques used in our scheme and list the properties that we want to achieve. In Section 3, we will present the structure of our scheme and every step in detail. In Section 4, we will analyze our scheme for the proposed requirements of electronic voting systems. Next, we will conclude and analyze this scheme in Section 5. Finally, the future work will be presented in the Section 6.
Background

Blind Signature
A blind signature [20] is a kind of digital signature that allows a person to get another person to sign a message without revealing the content of a message. The blind signature protocol was designed and presented for the first time by Chaum [11] . In electronic voting schemes, the blind signature is used to authenticate the voter without publishing the message in the ballot. As explained above, it is difficult for electronic voting schemes to reach the requirements of completeness and privacy at the same time. Blind signature may be a solution to this problem.
Our scheme uses blind signature to protect the privacy of voters and prohibit the illegal ballots. The voting initiator cannot link ballots with voters or see the original voting message when signing. When the voting is over, ballots with the signature of the voting initiator will be deemed as legal. In our scheme, m is the voting message including candidates selected by the voter and ticket number. We use the RSA algorithm to complete the blind signature, and the procedure is as follows:
Blind: we use Equation (1) to blind our message . m
Where ( , ) en is a public key of the voting initiator.
Sign: Equation (2) is the progress of signing.
Where ( , ) dn is a private key of the voting initiator.
Remove blind factor: The progress of removing the blind factor is shown in Equation (3).
Explanation: Because the RSA algorithm is shown in Equation (4):
Which is an original message signed by the voting initiator.
Ring Signature
A ring signature allows a signer to sign while preserving anonymity behind a group. Ring signature is developed from group signature. A group signature scheme [21] is a signature protocol where group members sign messages anonymously on behalf of the group. Only the group members can sign the messages, and the receiver of the signature cannot exclusively identify the signer. This protocol appoints a group manager to manage the group members' qualifications and sign their messages with the set of group members' key. However, in electronic voting systems, the privacy of voters cannot be guaranteed and the group manager could make illegal ballots that cannot be discovered by others. A ring signature scheme [22] is based on group signature scheme and improved some drawbacks of it. It is an autonomous scheme without a group manager and anonymity revocation. In our scheme, we use the ring signature scheme modified by Back in [23] . The ring signature scheme can be described as follows:
A ring signature contains three algorithms (GEN, SIG, VER, and LINK).
GEN: takes public parameters and outputs an ec-pair ( , ) px and a public key I .
SIG: takes a message m , a set s of public keys 1 2 3 { , , , , } n p p p p , and a key pair ( , ) ss px , and outputs a signature σ.
VER: takes a message m , a set s , and a signature, and outputs "true" or "false".
LINK: takes a set {} i I   and a signature σ, and outputs "linked" or "indep".
In our electronic voting scheme, we use blind signature to meet the requirements of eligibility and ring signature to protect the privacy of voters and prohibit "double-voting".
Blockchain
Blockchain technology has become popular due to the Bitcoin [12] currency, which is a peer-to-peer digital currency system proposed in 2008. The structure of blockchain block consists of a blockhead and a list of signed transactions. All transactions are hashed in a Merkle tree, with only the root included in the block head. Merkle tree root, previous block hash, block timestamp, and block height are included in the blockchain head. The structure of blockchain is shown in Figure 1 .
Bitcoin blockchain implements a consensus mechanism (called proof-of-work) that computes a nonce until a value is founded that satisfies the default difficulty. By this protocol, any changes in the behaviour of the previous blocks are considered impossible. This is a good feature for the electronic voting system. Meanwhile, in [24] , bitcoin users participate in transactions using virtual pseudonyms, referred to as bitcoin addresses. Generally, each bitcoin user can have different unlinkability addresses managed by a client. In fact, it is considered good practice to generate a new address for every transaction, even if this is not necessary [25] . This function also enhances privacy. In our scheme, a blockchain can be seen as a public, decentralized database, which can be examined by every user running a proper program. Blockchain databases consist of any behaviours that modify this database and are stored in blockchain blocks.
Blockchain was initially introduced for peer-to-peer bitcoin payments. Applying bitcoin blockchain to electronic voting systems is not particularly suitable. Recently, it has been used more broadly. Ethereum [17] supports the function to encode rules or scripts for processing transactions. This function has evolved to the idea of smart contracts. Ethereum's smart contract system has seen steady adoption, supporting tens of thousands of contracts and holding millions of dollars' worth of virtual coins. We can apply our electronic voting scheme to the Ethereum smart contract system. Transactions in blockchain are private. However, if it is applied to electronic systems originally, the verifiability and completeness of this scheme is difficult to achieve. Hence, we need a blind signature and ring signature to protect the verifiability and completeness while simultaneously maintaining the privacy.
Our Scheme
In this section, we provide a detailed description of our scheme. The protocol is executed in five stages and requires voter interaction in two rounds. First, we give an overview of the scheme in the following section.
Structure of Our Scheme
In this section, we use Figure 2 to show the structure of our voting scheme directly. On the high level, our scheme consists of five steps: Set Up, Make Ballot, Vote, Verify, and Tally. These five steps can be written as a smart contract in the Ethereum blockchain.
Set Up
Make Ballot Vote Verifty Tally Figure 2 . The structure of our electronic voting scheme
There are four roles in our voting scheme including Voters, Voting Initiators, Miners, and Candidates. Voters and Candidates play indispensable roles in the voting system. Voting Initiators and Miners play a role in getting the scheme to work. All their actions will be recorded in the block. Any illegal actions will be recorded, discovered, and discarded.
Finally, the bulletin board provided by the Ethereum blockchain is responsible for storing all the ballots in the election process. It is trusted to act as a reliable append-only broadcast channel. Its contents cannot be removed or modified once they are published, and it shows the same view to everyone. Finally, all the nodes in the system can check the tickets on the bulletin board. Figure 2 presents the five stages of the election in our voting scheme. The voting initiator is responsible for updating the list of eligible votes. A list of timers is enforced by the smart contract to ensure that the election progresses in a timely manner. The contract only allows eligible voters to register for an election and registered voters to cast a vote. Each stage of the election is described in more detail below:
Scheme Description
(1) Set Up phase: The voting initiator publishes all voting information (eligible voters' information, voting initiator's public key k p , candidates' information, and bulletin board address) and the set of voters' public keys 1 2 3 { , , , , } n p p p p to the entire blockchain network nodes. Also, the voting initiator is responsible for establishing a list of timers to ensure that the election progresses in a timely manner. The definition of list of time is shown below: Step ( , ) en is a public key of the voting initiator.
Step 2 Voters send their blind messages m to the voting initiator through blockchain. This transaction interaction can be signed by the voters' public key.
Step 3 The voting initiator checks the eligibility of the voters and signs the eligible voters' blind message with his own secret key:
, where ( , ) dn is a private key of the voting initiator.
Step 4 (3) Vote phase: Voters generate a one-time ring signature to protect their privacy during the voting progress. The ideal behind the one-time ring signature protocol is legibility: a user produces a signature that can be checked by a set of public keys rather than a unique public key. The identity of the signer is indistinguishable from the other users whose public keys are in the set until the owner produces a second signature using the same key pair. The voting process is shown as follows:
Step 1 Voters prepare to generate a one-time ring signature. Let G be a basepoint of the cyclic group where the discrete logarithm assumption is assumed to hold. Supposing the scheme has n members. Step 2 Voters select a random subset s of n from the other users' public key i p and his own key pair ( , ) xp. Let s be the signer's secret index.
The signer applies the following Equations (5), (6), (7), (8) , and (9) to generate the ring signature.
Where s H is a cryptographic hash function returning a value in .
So that 1 ,, n CC are defined.
Finally, the signer obtains the ring signature in Equation (10 Step 1 Miners check the validity of the ballots.
After
FnishVoting T , the voting initiator publishes his secret key used in the blind signature in order to help the miners check the validity of the ballots.
Miners check the message m and its blind signature s using the voting initiator's secret key x . Meanwhile, the legal ballots must be cast after .
FnishVoting T
Step 2 Miners check the validity of the one-time ring signature in Equation (11) 
For all mod in .
The verifier checks if signatures with image I have been used in the past. Multiple uses imply that two signatures were produced under the same secret key. Nobody can recover the public key from the key image and identify the identity of the signer. Meanwhile, the signer cannot make two signatures with different I and the same x . All the details of the scheme are explained above. This scheme can be written as a smart contract in the Ethereum blockchain. In the next section, we analyze our scheme according to the requirements of the electronic voting system proposed in [1] .
Analyses of the Scheme
As with any voting scheme, a variety of attack vectors exist. Many of these are common to all voting systems. Therefore, we present some common attacks in voting schemes and analyze these attacks with our scheme in this section. Also, as mentioned above, there are many requirements for electronic voting.
Completeness: All valid votes are counted correctly.
In our scheme, all miners can verify the validity of the ballots in the bulletin board. All legal ballots are stored in the bulletin board, and all nodes of network can tally the number of the ballots.
Soundness: The dishonest voter cannot disrupt the voting.
Although the public key set is visible to the entire network, it is impossible to get a correct blind signature and form a ring signature without the private key corresponding to the public key in the public key set 1 2 3 { , , , , } n p p p p .
From other aspects, the voting initiator cannot disrupt the soundness of our scheme. If the voting initiator gives his blind signature secret key to dishonest voters, the network can examine the number of ballots sent to the voting initiator with the number of ballots in the board bulletin. If the voting initiator's dishonest behaviours are found, this voting result will be rejected.
Privacy: All voters must be secret.
Voters use different sending addresses in the setup and vote phases. It is impossible for any nodes of the network to associate the set-up phase information with the vote stage.
Blind signature and ring signature protect the voter's privacy. The entire network only knows that the voter is in this range and does not know which voter is the specific one. In the setup phase, the voting initiator will publish all the information about voters. The entire network verifies the information. If he adds or deletes the voting rights of legitimate voters, the entire network can discover and consider the voting plan illegal. Then, the voting initiator uses his own secret key to sign the message. Illegal nodes cannot get the blind signature and legal ballots. Finally, a set of public keys containing only legitimate voter public keys is formed.
In the voting phase, only those who have their own public key in the public key collection can form a one-time ring signature. An illegal user cannot form a legitimate one-time ring signature and cast a valid ballot.
Fairness: Nothing must affect the voting.
For the voting initiator, all his actions are recorded in the block and he will be recorded if he has any unlawful actions. Voters stop this illegal voting plan.
For miners, their behaviours are constrained by other miners across the entire network. Any information recorded by miners in the blockchain will be verified by the entire network. If illegal behaviours are found, the block will be discarded. All ballots are stored in the bulletin board. No one can modify the ballots on the board. Meanwhile, all acts of voting are recorded in the block. Miners will detect all behaviours before writing blocks. Illegal acts will be discovered and abandoned.
From the above description and analysis, our electronic voting can meet all requirements of electronic voting schemes. It also can adapt to large-scale voting scenarios.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an electronic voting scheme with blockchain. This scheme does not need a verification center. All voting behaviors are supervised by the entire network and are stored in the blockchain. Also, we use blind signature and ring signature to protect the privacy of voters and prohibit "double-voting" behavior. Finally, we analyzed this scheme against the requirements of electronic voting.
Future Work
This work presents a new anonymous voting scheme with blockchain for boardroom. However, we also consider this work to be a starting point for future research on anonymous voting protocol. In future work, we will test our scheme in the Ethereum test network to improve the stability of our scheme and improve the detail design of our scheme.
